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Abstract  
This study considers different ways of measuring the ageing of societies and their implications 
for public policy. The first part characterises the ongoing ageing of the population in the EU28 by 
relating it to past and future longer-term demographic trends for broad groups of countries. It 
goes beyond traditional chronological measures, which are increasingly insufficient, such as the 
old-age dependency ratio, and includes recently suggested prospective measures of ageing. The 
second part of the study is concerned with economic dependency ratios; a more relevant measure 
for summarising the economic challenges related to ageing. Three main findings emerge: first, 
prospective indicators of ageing reveal the challenge of population ageing to be less onerous than 
traditional chronological measures would suggest. Their relevance, however, will depend on the 
degree to which policy changes can respond to the changing age structure of the population. 
Second, substantial increases in the length of working lives are necessary to maintain current 
economic dependency ratios. Taking a year-2000 perspective view of the economic challenges of 
ageing shows that substantial progress has been made. Third, looking towards 2050, education 
will have limited direct impact on the scale of the ageing challenge.   
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Measuring ageing and the need for 
longer working lives in the EU 
Mikkel Barslund and Marten von Werder* 
CEPS Working Document No. 417 / February 2016 
1. Introduction 
The average and median ages of people living in Europe are increasing. This has been the 
case for more than a century and is well recognised. The two major factors behind this 
phenomenon have been secular declines in fertility rates and mortality at older ages. Without 
changes to policies and behaviour this development will place enormous strain on European 
welfare states, as was indicated in the early 1990s (World Bank, 1994). The phenomenon is 
reflected in increasing old-age dependency ratios across Europe. While not a novel insight, it 
is still worth noting since much debate about the consequences of ageing still takes as its 
starting point the old-age dependency ratio. Moreover, until recently public policies related 
to pensions and the labour market were firmly fixed at the age of 65, or 60 in most European 
countries (in some cases even lower) and, importantly, had been so for half a century.   
However, as noted by several authors (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007, 2010, 2013; Lutz, 2009; 
Shoven, 2009; Spijker and MacInnes, 2013; Spijker, 2015; Barslund and Werder, 2015), only 
considering the conventional old-age dependency ratio is a static view of ageing, which by 
definition is bound to see increasing longevity as a challenge to public finances. Instead, they 
argue that ageing and associated challenges should be seen dynamically and linked to 
mortality developments.  
This study provides a comprehensive overview of different measures of ageing societies 
available to quantify the challenges stemming from population ageing. In particular focus is 
on prospective measures of ageing, which are designed to take increases in longevity into 
account. We apply these metrics to broad country groupings of the EU28 countries. While 
the challenges to welfare states do not disappear by measuring them differently, they do 
appear to be more manageable if one links the definition of ‘old’ that is embedded in 
pensions and labour policies to longevity increases at older ages. 
We conclude by looking at the changes to the length of working lives that will be needed to 
keep economic dependency rates constant at current levels towards 2050. As an analogue to 
the prospective measures to quantify the challenges of ageing societies, we envisage the 
increase in working lives to take place between the ages of 60 to 75.  
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. After describing the Eurostat population 
forecast (our main data source) and the assumptions behind it, we look at conventional 
measures of ageing (such as the demographic dependency ratio) across different broad 
regions in Europe. This is followed by an analysis of prospective measures on ageing. 
Finally, we look at economic dependency ratios, the role of education and the need for 
extending working lives to maintain current economic dependency ratios. 
                                                   
* Mikkel Barslund, CEPS (mikkel.barslund@ceps.eu) and Marten von Werder, Freie Universität Berlin 
(marten.werder@fu-berlin.de). 
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2. Data sources 
The main data source for this study is the EUROPOP2013 population projection prepared by 
Eurostat in 2013.1 This is supplemented by historical data points from Eurostat. The 
EUROPOP2013 set of projections provide population projections for all 28 EU countries for, 
respectively, a base scenario, and low and high fertility scenarios. We use the base scenario, 
but detailed assumptions on age-specific fertility, mortality and net migration are available 
to facilitate alternative projections. The projection horizon is 2080, with 2013 being the base 
year. Results in this study are presented up to 2050. The country-specific projections are 
based on a convergence scenario where the key demographic contributors – fertility and 
mortality – are assumed to converge towards the same value for all 28 countries in the very 
long run. Central features are a general increase in fertility for most countries (exceptions are 
Ireland, Sweden and France) and a further increase in life expectancy for all countries with 
convergence towards the value of low mortality countries. Migration projections are country-
specific based on historical values. Figures 1-3, below, illustrate the underlying assumptions. 
In order to keep the exposition tractable, the 28 EU countries are divided into six broad 
regional groups: 
 NC – Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), 
 WE – Western Europe (Ireland, UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg),  
 CE – Central-Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia),  
 SEE – South Eastern Europe (Bulgaria and Romania),  
 GS – German-speaking countries (Austria and Germany) and  
 SE – Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus). 
While there is variation within these groups, this grouping nevertheless allows for a 
consistent presentation of differences. Where relevant, individual country results are 
presented in the annex.  
2.1 Drivers of demographic change and ageing populations 
There are three fundamental drivers of demographic development: mortality, fertility and 
net migration. Assumptions based on these quantities are central to the outcome of the 
projections. It is well documented that the combination of ageing post-WWII baby boomers, 
the consistent fall in mortality rates at older ages and the secular fall in fertility rates, explain 
the nature of population ageing today (European Commission, 2014; World Bank, 1994). 
2.1.1 Fertility 
Developments in the total fertility rate are of importance to the structure of the adult 
population in the medium to long run. Changes in fertility today will start to affect the size 
of the labour force two decades from now.    
                                                   
1 A detailed description of the EUROPOP2013 projections is forthcoming. A short description is 
available from Eurostat (2015) and the European Commission (2014).  
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Figure 1. Total fertility rates for broad EU regions, 1960-2050  
 
Note: The total fertility rate in a given year is the average number of children a woman would have 
had at the end of her reproductive period if she was subject during her whole live to the fertility rates 
of the given year and if she was not subject to mortality risk. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
Figure 1 documents this declining trend since 1960 and illustrates the fertility assumptions 
behind the base scenario in EUROPOP2013.2 For western European countries fertility rates 
are projected to remain unchanged. For all other countries an increase in the total fertility 
rate is built into the projections. However, for central and southern European as well as 
German-speaking countries the total fertility rate is projected to stay well below replacement 
rates.  
2.1.2 Mortality at older ages 
Since the 1970s all EU countries have seen substantial declines in mortality rates at older ages 
(Figure 2). The decline has been faster in the EU15 compared to EU10 countries (World Bank, 
2015), which has manifested itself as a substantial divergence between EU10 and EU15 
countries in mortality. 
                                                   
2 The total fertility rate is sensitive to changes in the age when women choose to have children. 
Particularly in periods where the average age of first-time mothers is increasing the total fertility rate 
will underestimate the total number of children that women will have on average during their lifetime 
(Myrskylä et al., 2013).   
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Figure 2. Mortality at age 80 for men (left panel) and women (right panel) 
  
Note: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
2.1.3 Net migration 
Net migration is the most uncertain item in any population projection (Bongaarts & Bulatao, 
2000; Lee, 2011). Not only are projections highly uncertain they are also subject to large 
discrete changes that can affect the working age population substantially in the short run. 
While projections of mortality and fertility are also uncertain they are unlikely to show large 
discrete changes, implying that over shorter horizons (i.e. a 10-year horizon) they will not 
deviate markedly from projections. With some deviations, the EUROPOP2013 build upon 
historical rates of net migration in the projections (Figure 3) 
Figure 3. Net migration assumptions in EUROPOP2013 for broad EU regions, 1998-2050 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
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3. Measuring ageing  
3.1 Demographic dependency ratios 
The ageing of the European population is traditionally measured by the so-called Old-Age 
Dependency Ratio (OADR) that relates the number of people aged 65 years and over to the 
number of people of working age (20-64 years old) (WB, 1994). This ratio measures the 
number of older individuals that each working age individual will have to support. While 
recent developments in the OADR have been amply documented elsewhere (European 
Commission, 2015a, 2015; World Bank 2015), a few points are worth emphasising.  
Population ageing, as measured by the OADR, is no new phenomenon. It has been ongoing 
in all EU countries for a long time. Since 1960 the OADR has on average doubled for the 
EU28 countries. From a low of 0.16 – one person aged 65 and over for every 6 persons of 
working age – in 1960 to 0.3 in 2013 (Figure 4). The OADR is projected to rise to around 0.54 
in 2050. Thus, population ageing is set to increase in coming years but the extent to which it 
affects different European countries varies substantially. This is not only the case when we 
look at the outcome in 2050 but also at the trajectories.   
The Nordic countries have been experiencing an acceleration in the OADR in recent years 
but this will level off and the absolute increase in the OADR for the period 2013 to 2040 will 
in fact only be marginally higher than for the 25-year period 1960 to 1985.   
Figure 4. Old-age dependency ratio (OADR), 1960-2040 
 
Notes: Data since 1960 are not available for all countries. The figure shows OADR for countries with 
available data in a given year. 
NC – Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), WE – Western Europe (Ireland, UK, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), CE – Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltics (Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia), SEE – South Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria and Romania), GS – German-speaking countries (Austria and Germany) and SE – 
Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus).  
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
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For western Europe the acceleration will be sharper and last for longer, particularly when 
compared with the 1960 to 2013 period. However, the difference in the absolute OADR 
between western Europe and the Nordic countries is not large. The German-speaking 
countries face the steepest ageing curve over the next two decades. The average yearly 
increase in the number of people aged 65+ for each 20 to 64 year old will increase more than 
three times as fast in the next 20 years as it did in the period from 1960 to today. This, 
combined with an already large number of older people for each working age individual, 
means that the OADR for Austria and Germany will be much higher than for the Nordic 
countries and western Europe. The prospective trajectories of countries in south-eastern 
Europe (SSE) and central Europe and the Baltics (CE) are similar to those of German-
speaking countries, although they start from a lower OADR today. The development for 
central Europe and the Baltics is much steeper. Southern Europe is projected to have the 
highest OADR in 2050. The increase is less steep than for the German-speaking countries 
towards 2030, but the OADR will continue to increase in southern Europe, while it will level 
off for the German-speaking countries.  
The broad grouping of countries employed here is useful to cover broad trends of broadly 
similar countries, but there are differences among individual countries within these groups 
(see Annex, Table A1). Notable exemptions among the larger countries from the common 
trends are Italy and Spain in the group of southern European countries. The projected 
increase in the old-age dependency ratio for Spain is substantially larger than for Italy (with 
Portugal and Greece in between), which is reflected in a much steeper trajectory for the 
OADR in Spain.   
3.1.1 Age composition of the very old  
The group of people aged 65 or over is heterogeneous, in particular with respect to the health 
and long-term care needed. The age composition of this group is therefore of separate 
interest, and it will change towards 2050 (Figure 5). While the fact that the share of very old 
as a percentage of the old will increase is well known (European Commission, 2015b; World 
Bank, 1994), it is interesting to note that for the next 5 to 10 years all countries will see a 
levelling off, if not actually a decrease, in the percentage of very old people. The only 
exception to this is the southern Europe region. The main reason is that the post-WWII baby 
boomers started to reach the age of 65 in 2010. This bulge of people tend to make the 
population aged 65 and over younger by comparison. Intra-EU differences are sizeable but 
will not increase further in the next two decades. 
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Figure 5. Share of people older than 85 in 65+ year olds 
 
Note: See Figure 4. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
These differences among European major regions visible in Figures 4 and 5 are further spelt 
out when looking at the average and median ages of the population in the 100-year period 
from 1960 to 2060 (Table 1). Median and average ages will continue to increase, but at a 
slower pace in the coming 50 years compared with the preceding 50 years. 
Table 1. Average and median ages for different regions (selected years) 
Average age 
Country 1960 1980 2010 2040 2060 
Nordic countries NC 33.9 36.6 40.4 42.5 43.2 
WE WE 33.2 35.6 39.3 42.7 43.2 
CE CE 30.6 33.6 39.5 45.7 47.1 
SEE SEE 31.7 33.5 40.6 44.9 46.0 
GS GS 35.4 37.3 42.8 47.5 48.1 
SOE SOE 31.9 33.9 41.7 47.1 47.6 
Median age 
Country 1960 1980 2010 2040 2060 
NC NC 33 34 40 42 42 
WE WE 31 33 39 42 42 
CE CE 28 30 38 48 48 
SEE SEE 30 31 40 47 46 
GS GS 34 36 43 49 49 
SOE SOE 30 32 41 49 48 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (Eurostat, 2015). 
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3.1.2 Regional (NUTS2) differences 
While countries will differ in their rate of ageing so will, to an even greater extent, the 
different (NUTS2) regions within and among countries (Figure 6). The figure shows the 
difference in the median age between the NUTS2 region with the lowest and largest median 
ages within EU countries. All but a few countries, except Finland, Portugal, Greece, Sweden 
and Bulgaria, will see a widening age dispersion among regions. Relatively old countries 
today will see large increases in regional median age differences, most notably Germany. The 
main reason for this is that large metropolitan areas will not age much, whereas in more 
rural areas the ageing of the population will be more rapid. 
Figure 6. Country differences in lowest and highest median age among NUTS2 regions, 1995, 2013 
and 2040 
 
Notes: Only countries with four or more NUTS2 regions are shown. Excludes the regions of: Ciudad 
Autónoma de Melilla (NUTS2 code ES64), Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta (ES63), French Guyana (FR93), 
Réunion (FR94). 
Source: Eurostat regional population projections (2015).  
3.1.3 Total dependency ratio 
Traditionally the focus has been on the OADR’s measure of pensioners per working age 
adult. This measure leaves out the large group of young people aged up to 20 years old. The 
main reason for this distinction is that pensioners affect public finances to a much larger 
extent than young people due to pension benefits and much larger health care costs 
(Barslund & Werder, 2015). However, falling fertility rates has been the other major driver of 
population ageing in most European countries (Figure 1). This implies that focusing only on 
the OADR may underestimate the challenges facing many countries, because the adjustment 
process in the last two decades has been aided by a falling number of young people.  
The total dependency ratio relates the number of people in inactive ages – the young, 0-19 
year olds plus the old above 65 – to the 20 to 64 years old. This gives the ratio of inactive to 











DE UK FR AT BE IT DK PT NL ES CZ HU RO BG SE EL PL FI
1995 2013 2040
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TDR among broad regions. The projection part resembles the OADR shown in Figure 4 
because fertility is assumed to stay roughly constant in the projection period (Figure 1), thus 
the young dependency ratio – number of people under 20 years old and over 20 to 64 year 
olds – will be relatively flat. The main point to note is the difference vis-à-vis the historical 
part of Figure 4. Whereas the OADR has been rising in the period shown, this has been more 
than offset by a decrease in the number of young people, leading to a fall in the TDR.   
Figure 7. Panel A. Total dependency ratio (TDR), 1960-2040 
 
Figure 7. Panel B. Normalised Total dependency ratio (TDR, 2013=1), 1960-2040 
 
Note: See Figure 4. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
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Figure 7 panel B presents the total dependency ratio normalised to 1 in 2013. It serves two 
main purposes. First, it is clear that most countries are now at the trough of the TDR. 
Increases in the number of older individuals are no longer offset by a decrease in the number 
of children and young people. Second, there are significant differences among country 
groupings in relation to the scale of the future challenges faced. The percentage increase in 
the TDR ranges from 16% (Nordic countries) to 50% (Central European countries). This is 
also reflected in differences in the rate of increases in the TDR expected in the next 10 years. 
3.2 Adjusting for increasing longevity: prospective measures of ageing   
A central feature of the increase in life expectancy in the last 40 to 50 years has been a 
decrease in mortality at older ages (see Figure 2, above). In such an environment, measures 
of ageing that build on fixed chronological cut-offs (i.e. 65 years old) may not be the best or 
most accurate method to measure the age of a society (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007, 2010, 
2013; Lutz, 2009; Shoven, 2009; Spijker and MacInnes, 2013; Spijker, 2015). Even a stable 
population, i.e. a population with longer-term constant fertility and mortality rates, with a 
replacement fertility rate would experience an increase in the old age and total dependency 
ratios if mortality at older ages were to increase. Thus, chronological measures of ageing – by 
definition – depict increases in longevity as a societal challenge. To illustrate this Table 2 
shows the difference between the OADR as presented in Figure 4 and the OADR of the same 
country groupings but where the population projection is arrived at by holding mortality 
constant at 2013 level. The difference in OADR between the two projections shows the part 
of the ageing challenge that is directly due to increased longevity, and therefore at least 
seems desirable from a societal point of view.  
Table 2. Changes in old-age dependency ratios due to mortality changes  
Country 
region 
Projected mortality changes 
Change in OADR 2013 2050 
Mortality fixed at 2013 level  
Change in OADR 2013 -2050 
Difference 
in change 
NC 0.06 0.03 0.03 
WE 0.11 0.08 0.03 
CE 0.23 0.17 0.06 
SEE 0.21 0.13 0.08 
GS 0.17 0.12 0.05 
SOE 0.22 0.18 0.04 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (Eurostat, 2015). The population projection with 
constant mortality is made following Barslund and Werder (2015b). 
The share of the total predicted change in the OADR that is due to longevity differs among 
countries and to some extent is negatively related to the fall in the fertility rate in the decades 
preceding 2013. However, it is clear that for all regions a non-negligible part of the increase 
in the projected OADR is due (as one would expect) to the change in mortality. 
A number of authors have proposed so-called prospective measures of ageing, which in 
various ways account for increasing longevity (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2005, 2007, 2010, 
2013; Lutz, 2009; Shoven, 2009; Spijker and MacInnes, 2013). From a policy perspective the 
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most promising prospective indicator is the prospective old-age dependency ratio.3 The 
prospective old age dependency ratio (POADR) adjusts the age limit for being ‘old’ by the 
development in life expectancy. Specifically, the POADR is defined as  
ܱܲܣܦܴ௧ = ௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡	{௔௚௘வ௔௚௘ௗ|{	ೃಽಶರೋ}} 		௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡೟ 	{ଶ଴ஸ௔௚௘೟ஸ௔௚௘ௗ|{	ೃಽಶರೋ}, 
where the nominator counts the number of people with remaining life expectancy (RLE) less 
than Z years, and the denominator counts the population in the age group 20 years old to the 
age at which RLE is less than Z years. Z is often set at 15 years, however, in our application, 
Z is calibrated to correspond approximately to the median retirement age in Europe (65, with 
Z being 19 years of remaining life expectancy). With this calibration the definition of the 
POADR corresponds to the OADR where the cut-off point (and hence the statutory pension 
age is adjusted with gains in life expectancy).4   
The POADR expands the age bracket of non-dependents in line with life expectancy at older 
ages. Similarly, one can define the total prospective old age dependency ratio (TPOADR) as 
ܱܲܣܦܴ௧ = ௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡	{௔௚௘೟ழଶ଴}	ା	௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡	{௔௚௘வ௔௚௘ௗ|{	ೃಽಶರೋ}} 		௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡೟ 	{ଶ଴ஸ௔௚௘೟ஸ௔௚௘ௗ|{	ೃಽಶರೋ} . 
Here, young people are added to the nominator. Even with prospective measures the age 
composition of the group of ‘old’ people can be of policy significance. An analogous 
prospective indicator to the measure of the share of 85+ year olds in the group of 65+ year 
olds (Figure 5), a prospective very old age ratio, can be defined as 
ܸܱܲܣܴ௧ = 	௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡	{௔௚௘வ௔௚௘ௗ|{	ೃಽಶರೊ}} 		௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡	{௔௚௘வ௔௚௘ௗ|{	ೃಽಶರೋ}} . 
The prospective very old age ratio calculates the share of those people with RLE less than Y 
in the population of people with RLE less than Z (with Y < Z). Setting Z equal to 19 and Y 
equal to 6 in 2013 yields approximately for EU28 the 85+ to 65+ ratio depicted in Figure 5 for 
the year 2013.  
Informally, looking at prospective measures adjusts for the part of the increase in the old age 
dependency ratio that is due to increasing longevity. This is useful in assessing to what 
extent adjustment of public finances should come from working longer (Andersen, 2014).   
Figure 8, panel A, depicts POADRs for the six country groups where the cut-off point for 
being old is set at a remaining life expectancy of 19 years. At a European average this was 
                                                   
3 See Spijker (2015) for a recent survey of indicators of ageing. Related to the POADR is what Spijker 
denotes as the proportion of the population with remaining life expectancy of X years or less to the 
total population. The choice of X is arbitrary (often set at 15 years) but can be calibrated so that the 
cut-off is equal to e.g. the official retirement age in a given year. Another measure is the population 
average remaining years of life. This measure is equal to the population-weighted sum over remaining 
life expectancy in different age groups. A third demographically interesting measure is the 
prospective median age. This measure starts from a reference population, e.g. the population in 2013. 
The prospective median age in a given future year is the age of the person in the 2013 population that 
has the same life expectancy as the median aged person in the given year in the future. For an 
application of these measures to European countries, see Mamolo and Scherbov (2009).   
4 Such designs are becoming more common in the EU. See Shoven and Goda (2010) for a more general 
discussion of adjusting government policies to developments in mortality. 
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roughly reached at the age of 65 in 2013.5 Compared to Figure 4, the POADR curves are 
substantially flatter. The large fall in fertility (Figure 1) in German-speaking, central and 
southern European countries is also apparent in Figure 8. These regions face a steeper ageing 
of the population compared to the Nordic countries and western Europe where fertility has 
held up. 
Looking at the TPOADR – young and old for each active individual, where the threshold for 
being active is postponed with increases in life expectancy at older ages – the implied 
societal challenges of an ageing population seem to diminish. The difference between Panel 
A and B in Figure 8 is the continued fall in the number of young due to the below 
replacement rate fertility assumptions.   
Figure 8. Panel A. Prospective old age dependency ratio (POADR), 1960-2050 
  
Figure 8. Panel B: Total prospective old age dependency ratio (TPOADR), 1960-2050 
  
Note: The value for 2013 differs from the one in Figure 4 due to differences in remaining life 
expectancy at age 65. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
                                                   
5 The population-weighted life expectancy at 65 years of age was 19.4 years for the EU28 in 2013. At 67 
life expectancy is just below 18. 
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Returning to the age composition of the very old in Europe, Figure 9 depicts the PVOADR. 
While the prospective share of very old people will increase, the difference in comparison to 
Figure 5 is stark. Take as an example the German-speaking countries; their prospective very 
old share increases by one-third when measured prospectively, whereas it more than 
doubles when measured conventionally (see Figure 5).  
Figure 9. Prospective measure of the very old age dependency ratio (RLE<7 / RLE<19), 1960-2050 
  
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 (see Eurostat, 2015). 
4. Economic dependency ratios and longer working lives 
The old-age dependency and the prospective old-age dependency ratios are indicative of 
society’s potential to sustain its dependent population. They differ in how to distinguish 
between dependent and non-dependent people. There are, however, many dependent or 
non-labour market active people among the 20 to 64 year olds, as evidenced by labour 
market participation rates being well below one, in particular in older age groups in this age 
bracket. The economic dependency ratio (EDR) measures the number of labour market 
inactive individuals (irrespective of age) relative to the number of labour market active 
persons (irrespective of age). It gives a summary measure of how many extra people a 
working individual has to support. Formally, the EDR is defined as  
ܧܦܴ௧ = 	்௢௧௔௟	௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡ି		∑ #௣௘௥௦௢௡	௔௚௘௚௥௢௨௣∗௅ெ௉ோ	௔௚௘௚௥௢௨௣ೌ೒೐೒ೝ೚ೠ೛ ೟			∑ #௣௘௥௦௢௡	௔௚௘௚௥௢௨௣∗௅ெ௉ோ	௔௚௘௚௥௢௨௣ೌ೒೐೒ೝ೚ೠ೛ . 
Where LMPR is the labour market participation rate for the given age group. 
For most countries labour market participation rates are only available from the mid-1990s, 
which makes long historical comparisons infeasible.6 The development in the EDRs to some 
extent resembles the OADR in Figure 4 for the projection period (left hand side, Figure 10). 
However, in the last two decades most countries have seen a decline in the EDR. In fact, for 
none of the six country regions will the EDR in 2020 be above its recent historical maximum. 
With unchanged labour market participation, however, EDRs will continue their recent 
increase and will in 2040-50 be substantially above any value observed since the mid-1990s. 
This also implies that although European societies have been ageing in the conventional old-
                                                   
6 Longer time series are available for some (western) European countries via the International Social 
Security project (see Milligan and Wise, 2015). 
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age dependency ratio sense for decades, the number of people supported by each person 
employed has actually gone down in the last 20 years. Figure 10 also reveals the differences 
within the EU28 in the level of economic dependency ratios. The EDR for the GS countries 
will not reach the current level of western European countries until after 2025.  
Given the focus on extending working lives over the last two decades, it is also of interest to 
see how much of the recent fall in the EDR is due to favourable demographics and how 
much is due to increasing labour market participation rates. We do this by looking at the 
future EDRs from the viewpoint of labour force participation rates in the year 2000 (Figure 
10, right hand side). Looking at the pre-projection period, the interesting thing to note is that 
most EDR curves are upward sloping from the year 2000. However, increases in labour force 
participation, in particular among 50 to 74 year olds, from 2000 and onwards changed the 
trajectory of the curves. The second main issue of interest is the level of the EDRs in 2050. 
Comparing the projected EDRs in 2050 between the LHS and RHS of Figure 10 tells us how 
far we have come since the year 2000 in addressing the challenge towards 2050. This 
suggests that even if the challenge to EDRs from population ageing looks impressive (Figure 
10 LHS), in the last 15 years there has been much progress in addressing this by extending 
working lives.  
Figure 10. Economic dependency ratio, 1980-2050 
  
Note: The LHS graph shows the economic dependency ratios (EDRs) using historical labour force 
participation rates before 2013 and 2013 rates for the projection. The RHS graphs presents synthetic 
historical EDRs constructed with labour force participation rates from the year 2000. Data for Central 
Europe (CE) are not available for this. Excludes Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus due to 
incomplete information on labour force participation for different age groups. For Bulgaria and 
Romania labour market participation rates are not available for the 70-74 years age group. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013. 
4.1 Education as a driver of future labour market participation rates  
As populations age across Europe, extending working lives is one necessary policy 
prescription. An important question is therefore: to what extent can working lives be 
projected to increase in the future? Projecting labour market participation rates is beyond the 
scope of this study, however.7 One important determinant of future labour market 
participation is the level of education of the future older cohorts. Better educated persons 
                                                   
7 For more elaborate attempts to estimate future labour market participation, see Loichinger (2015) or 
Dolls et al. (2014).  
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tend to work longer. Older cohorts with higher levels of educational attainment should thus 
‘mechanically’ extend working lives without additional changes to policies. Education has 
been an important driver of labour force participation of older age groups in the last two 
decades (Gros, 2015; Maestas and Zissimopoulos, 2010). Education can to some extent be 
forecasted by the current level of educational attainment in the younger population (see 
Annex A3). Since younger cohorts are better educated than older cohorts the future working 
age population will be better educated. The change in EDRs driven by this increase in labour 
market participation rates can be informally interpreted as a projection of future EDRs in the 
absence of institutional changes (e.g. changes in pension age and benefits systems). A 
straightforward way to make a simple projection of future education levels is to keep each 
cohort’s level of educational attainment fixed at the present (2013) level. New cohorts enter 
with the same amount of education as today’s young cohorts.8 This procedure gives a 
conservative estimate for the future education level of new cohorts entering the labour 
market. 
The important message arising from this simple model is that while better education in itself 
is likely to dampen the increase in the economic dependency ratio, it does not fundamentally 
change the problem faced by many countries (Figure 11 and Table 3). This is in line with the 
findings from more advanced modelling as in Loichinger (2015). 
Figure 11. Economic dependency ratio adjusting for increasing education levels, 1980-2050 
 
Note: Excludes Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia due to incomplete information on labour 
force participation for different age groups. For Bulgaria and Romania labour market participation 
rates are not available for the 70-74 year old age group. 
Only for the Nordic countries (where the scale of the challenge is comparatively small) does 
accounting for educational change of the population make a relatively large difference (Table 
                                                   
8 Specifically, we let labour market participation rates unchanged for the 15-29 year olds and update 
every new 30-34 year old cohort with the current level of educational attainment of 30-34 year olds.   
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3). For western European and German-speaking countries it reduces the increase in the EDR 
by around one-sixth, and this is approximately the same for central and southern European 
countries. In order to stabilise economic dependency ratios at the 2013 level there would be a 
need to extend working lives beyond what an educational upgrade of the labour force can 
deliver.   
Table 3. Increase in economic dependency ratios (EDRs) 2013-2050 
Broad regions Percentage change in the EDR from 2013 to 2050 with  
Constant age-specific 
2013 labour market 
participation rates 
Simple model of increasing 




NC 7 4 3 
WE 30 24 6 
GS 28 24 4 
SEE 65 64 1 
SOE 68 58 10 
CE 53 43 10 
Note: The results from south-east Europe (SEE) are influenced by a lack of data on labour market 
participation for different educational levels for 70-74 year olds and unusually high labour market 
participation at older ages for low levels of educational attainment.  
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 and Eurostat LFS Statistics. 
4.2 Working for how much longer? 
Solving the public finance challenges arising from population ageing will likely involve 
many remedies from different policy areas. In addition, uncertainties regarding the 
projection of many quantities – relating foremost to health and long-term care expenditures 
make precise long-term policy prescription difficult. The reason behind the focus on the 
economic dependency ratio is that, in a stylised world, keeping it constant would eliminate 
the need for further redistribution from workers to non-workers and at the same time allow 
the same relative consumption between workers and non-workers in place today.   
We therefore turn to the estimated length of working life necessary to keep the economic 
dependency ratio constant for each of the six broad country groupings. This is done by 
increasing labour force participation for the age group of 60-74 year olds in 2050 so as to 
keep the EDR at the same level as in 2013. Naturally, effective longer working lives can be 
attained by each person working on average more in the early years of the working life; this 
includes getting more women into the labour force; something for which there is scope in the 
southern and central parts of Europe.     
Table 4 presents the results. For all country groupings a substantial extension of working 
lives is necessary to keep the EDR constant. The labour force participation rate has to 
increase by a factor between 2 and 4, depending on the country. What is most striking about 
Table 4, however, is how similar the need for extending working lives is across country 
groups. The Nordic countries and western Europe require the smallest increase in the 60-74 
year old labour market participation rate, but here the average length of a working life is 
already long. The German-speaking countries stand out with an already long working life 
but still have a substantial need to extend it, whereas the required remedy in the south, 
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south-east and central Europe does not differ much among these countries. These required 
changes are in line with (although at the upper end of) what was found in Barslund and 
Werder (2015) using National Transfer Accounts for a limited set of countries.    
Table 4. Necessary change in length of working lives to keep EDRs constant 
Broad regions Labour force participation rate Average length of working life 
2013 2050 2013 Change to 2050 
55-59 Years 60-74 year  60-74 years    
NC 83.4 28.6 52.6 40.3 3.6 
WE 73.5 19.4 52.3 37.3 4.9 
GS 78.4 23.8 71.0 38.7 7.1 
SEE 59.9 22.0 60.2 33.5 5.7 
SOE 64.0 13.6 54.5 33.2 6.1 
CE 64.8 13.1 52.5 33.9 5.9 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 and Eurostat LFS Statistics. 
We can get a feeling of the size of the required increases in the labour force participation rate 
by looking at changes from 2000 to 2013 (Table 5).  
Table 5. Changes in length for working lives for 50-74 and 60-74 year olds, 2000-14 
Broad regions Change in working life length 
2000-2013 Additionally required, 2013-2050 
50-74 years 60-74 years 60-74 years  
NC 1.8 1.3 3.6 
WE 2.3 1.1 4.9 
GS 3.1 2.0 7.1 
SEE -1.2 -1.8 5.7 
SOE 2.0 0.4 6.1 
CE 1.6 0.2 5.9 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 and Eurostat LFS Statistics. 
5. Conclusion 
We have employed a number of concepts and indicators to measure the ageing of European 
societies. To our knowledge, it is the first application of prospective measures to all 28 EU 
countries. Clearly measuring ageing prospectively does not change the basic facts of 
population ageing; those of falling fertility and decreasing mortality at older ages. Ageing 
and how to organise important societal institutions (most notably the labour market) to 
adjust to it, is a challenge for policy-makers, and this is clear from all indicators. The 
development in the total old-age dependency ratio, a conventional measure of ageing, also 
makes it clear that for most countries ageing only now really starts to bite if policies remain 
unchanged.  
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Prospective measures do emphasise that with the right adjustments of policies and 
institutions underpinning them, the process of ageing in European societies − even if it is a 
permanent feature for the foreseeable future − does not need to spell relative decline. Our 
stylised analysis of the economic dependency ratio shows that over the next 35 years (and 
probably for even longer) a significant extension of working lives will be necessary to sustain 
current relative per capita consumption. But it also reveals that demography is not destiny in 
terms of sustaining economic dependency ratios at current levels. Looking back at the 
historical development from 2000 to 2013 shows that, viewed from the year 2000, economic 
dependency ratios were set to increase. However, due to higher labour force participation 
rates among the 50-74 year olds especially, the economic dependency ratio actually declined 
in that period. The process of extending working lives will have to speed up towards 2050 in 
order to keep economic dependency ratios at current levels. Is that possible? Results from 
studies of current working capacity among 50-74 year olds suggests that it is, in particular if 
the horizon is 2050 and beyond  (Barslund, 2015; Jousten and Lefèbvre, 2015; Milligan and 
Wise, 2015; Cutler et al., 2013). In fact, the discussion should not be so much about if but 
rather how. Putting the right policies in place to provide the right incentives for all people to 
work longer and at the same time ensure an acceptable standard of living for those who 
cannot will be the crucial social policy questions for the coming decades.  
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Annex A 




Source: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013. 
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Table A3. Labour force participation of educational achievement classes and net government transfers, 
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